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THE EXPANSION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW
Carissa Byrne Hessick
This Symposium essay identifies two dramatic expansions of child pornography
law: prosecutions for possessing images of children who are clothed and not
engaged in any sexual activity, and prosecutions for possessing smaller portions
of artistic and non-pornographic images. These prosecutions have expanded the
definition of the term ‘‘child pornography’’ well beyond its initial meaning.
What is more, they signal that child pornography laws are being used to punish
people not necessarily because of the nature of the picture they possess, but rather
because of the conclusion that those individuals are sexually attracted to chil-
dren. If law enforcement concludes that a person finds an image of a child to be
sexually arousing, then these laws can subject that individual to punishment,
even though the image would have been perfectly innocuous had it been pos-
sessed by someone else.
Keywords: child pornography, criminal law, First Amendment, Texas, New
Jersey
I N TRODUCT ION
Over the past four decades, America has waged a legal battle against child
pornography. That battle has become more intense in the past twenty
years. We have dramatically increased the punishment associated with
creation, distribution, and possession of child pornography.1 We have
significantly increased the number of child pornography prosecutions.2
1. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88
WASH. U. L. REV. 853, 856–64 (2011) [hereinafter Hessick, Disentangling].
2. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Questioning the Modern Criminal Justice Focus on Child
Pornography Possession, in REFINING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW: CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND
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And we have increasingly come to view child pornography prosecutions as
a way to protect children from sexual abuse.
Increasing the number of prosecutions and the severity of punishment is
not the only way in which we have targeted child pornography; we have
also increased the scope of child pornography law. Legislatures and prose-
cutors have begun to use child pornography laws not only to punish those
who create or possess traditional child pornography images—images that
are created when a child is molested or sexually manipulated by an adult—
but also to punish those who create or possess different types of images.
Some defendants have been punished for secretly filming underage indivi-
duals; some have been punished for digitally altering an innocent image of
a child to make it appear sexually explicit; and teenagers have even been
prosecuted for taking sexually explicit images of themselves (a practice
sometimes referred to as ‘‘sexting’’).
This symposium essay identifies two dramatic expansions of child por-
nography law: prosecutions for possessing images of children who are
clothed and not engaged in any sexual activity, and prosecutions for pos-
sessing smaller portions of artistic and non-pornographic images. These
prosecutions have expanded the definition of the term ‘‘child pornography’’
well beyond its initial meaning. What is more, they signal that child
pornography laws are being used to punish people not necessarily because
of the nature of the picture they possess, but rather because of the conclu-
sion that those individuals are sexually attracted to children. If law enforce-
ment concludes that a person finds an image of a child to be sexually
arousing, then these laws can subject that individual to punishment, even
though the image would have been perfectly innocuous had it been pos-
sessed by someone else.
This focus on the subjective thoughts of defendants is problematic. It
changes child pornography law from an endeavor designed to protect
children from harm, to an effort to punish those individuals who are
sexually attracted to children. This shift is inconsistent with child pornog-
raphy law’s constitutional origins, and it creates incentives that may ulti-
mately leave children less safe.
SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 148 tbl.1 (C.B. Hessick ed., 2016) [hereinafter Hessick, Ques-
tioning]; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF COMMERCIAL
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN CASES, 2004–2013, at 6 fig.4 (2017), available at
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fpcsecc0413.pdf
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The essay proceeds in three parts. Part I traces the rise of child pornog-
raphy law in the Supreme Court, and it notes how lower courts have
expanded on the definition. Part II describes two recent expansions of the
category of child pornography—a new statutory definition in New Jersey,
and a recent case out of Texas. Part III provides a critical analysis of those
expansions.
I . CH I LD PORNOGRAPHY LAW
The first child pornography prohibitions appear to have been prompted by
media coverage.3 In 1977, the Chicago Tribune ran a series of articles on
‘‘child predators.’’ The series ran on the front page, for four consecutive
days, and it included an article devoted to child pornography.4 Before these
stories ran, only a small handful of states had criminalized child pornog-
raphy.5 But then a ‘‘wave of child pornography legislation . . . swept the
statehouses’’ in 1977 and 1978.6 Most of these new laws criminalized the
production and distribution of child pornography images that were
obscene.7 Because obscenity was already widely prohibited in American
jurisdictions,8 the new child pornography laws provided little in the way of
3. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Introduction, in REFINING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW:
CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES 3 (C.B. Hessick ed., 2016) [hereinafter
Hessick, Introduction].
4. Richard S. Pope, Child Pornography: A New Role for the Obscenity Doctrine, 1978
U. ILL. L.F. 711, 713–14 n.10; see also T. Christopher Donnelly, Protection of Children from
Use in Pornography: Towards Constitutional and Enforceable Legislation, 12 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 295, 295 n.1 (1979) (collecting media sources).
5. California enacted the first prohibition in 1961. 1961 Cal. Stat., c. 2147 § 5,
pp. 4428–29. North Dakota and Tennessee enacted laws in 1975. 1975 N.D. Stat., c. 119,
pp. 429–31; Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-3013 (1975).
6. Jennifer M. Payton, Note, Child Pornography Legislation, 17 J. FAM. L. 505, 520
(1978–79). See also Donnelly, supra note 4, at 305–06 nn.64–67 (collecting statutes).
7. See Pope, supra note 4, at 712 (‘‘Ten of the thirteen jurisdictions that had enacted child
pornography legislation by early 1978 either based their statutes on the obscenity exception
to first amendment protection, or did not punish speech, and thus did not need an
obscenity requirement.’’); see also NATIONAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY
AND PROTECTION, CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION: BACKGROUND & LEGAL ANALYSIS
112–13 (1984) (noting different approaches to obscenity issue in the states); Payton, supra
note 6, at 521–31 (same).
8. See generally FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 8–29 (1976).
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added protection for children. But then the U.S. Supreme Court, in New
York v. Ferber,9 held that child pornography was entitled to no First
Amendment protection, and that states could criminalize its production
and distribution even if the images were not obscene.10
After Ferber was decided in 1982, state and federal laws criminalizing
non-obscene child pornography proliferated.11 Child pornography laws
expanded again when the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of a law criminalizing the private possession of child pornography in
Osborne v. Ohio.12 Because the Supreme Court had previously stated that
the private possession of obscene materials was protected by the First
Amendment,13 some thought that the private possession of child por-
nography was also constitutionally protected.14 Osborne explained that
possession of child pornography was not protected because the state’s
interest in prohibiting private possession of child pornography was much
stronger than their interests in prohibiting possession of other obscene
materials.15 Before Osborne was decided in 1990, only some states crim-
inalized possession of child pornography.16 Now, all fifty states prohibit
the creation, distribution, and possession of child pornography,17 as does
the federal government.18
9. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
10. The ‘‘term’’ pornography is generally used to refer to sexually explicit images.
Whether a specific image is obscene is a legal question that is determined according to ‘‘(a)
whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.’’ Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1972).
11. Hessick, Introduction, supra note 3, at 4.
12. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
13. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
14. E.g., Susan G. Caughlan, Note, Private Possession of Child Pornography: The Tensions
Between Stanley v. Georgia and New York v. Ferber, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 187 (1987)
15. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109–11.
16. See Josephine R. Potuto, Stanley þ Ferber ¼ The Constitutional Crime of At-Home
Child Pornography Possession, 76 KY. L.J. 15, 18 n.18 (1978) (collecting statutes criminalizing
the possession of child pornography); see also Caughlan, supra note 14, at 201 (similar).
17. See Shannon Shafron-Perez, Average Teenager or Sex Offender? Solutions to the Legal
Dilemma Caused by Sexting, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 431, 437 n.35 (2009)
(collecting sources).
18. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2260.
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In its early child pornography decisions, the Supreme Court emphasized
that child pornography is not entitled to First Amendment protection
because children are harmed in the creation of child pornography images.19
Specifically, children are molested or exploited in order to create the
images.20 But the harm of creating child pornography is not the only
reason the Court gave for exempting child pornography from First Amend-
ment protection. In both Ferber and Osborne the Court also expressed
concern that the children depicted in child pornography suffered further
privacy harms from the subsequent circulation of their images.21 And the
Osborne Court also indicated that child pornography was exempt from First
Amendment protection because prohibiting possession of child pornogra-
phy could help to protect future victims of child sex abuse, not just those
children depicted in child pornography. The Court based this conclusion
on sources suggesting that ‘‘pedophiles use child pornography to seduce
other children into sexual activity.’’22
The Supreme Court eventually abandoned this argument from Osborne
and imposed some limits on what can qualify as child pornography in
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.23 Ashcroft involved a First Amendment
challenge to the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, which outlawed
virtual child pornography—that is, pornographic images created wholly by
technological means—and any other ‘‘visual depiction’’ that ‘‘is, or appears to
be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.’’24 The Court con-
cluded that the statute was unconstitutional, explaining that virtual child
pornography fell outside the constitutional category of child pornography.25
19. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109–11; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757–59. The Court also identified
the privacy interests of the children depicted as another reason. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, The
Limits of Child Pornography, 89 IND. L.J. 1437, 1443–51 (2014) [hereinafter Hessick, Limits]
(discussing the role that these two rationales play in the Court’s child pornography decisions).
20. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757, 758 n.9; see also Hessick, Limits, supra note 19, at 1452–64
(arguing that the definition of child pornography ought to be limited to ‘‘those images
created through the sexual exploitation or abuse of children’’ and should not include images
whose only harm to children is to infringe upon their privacy rights).
21. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759–60.
22. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111.
23. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
24. Id. at 241.
25. See id. at 246; see also id. at 240 (‘‘The principal question to be resolved, then, is
whether the CPPA is constitutional where it proscribes a significant universe of speech that
is neither obscene under Miller nor child pornography under Ferber.’’).
EXPANSION OF CH ILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW | 325
In so holding, the Ashcroft Court explicitly rejected the reasoning from
Osborne about protecting future victims of child sex abuse, as a sufficient
government interest to outweigh the individual interests at stake.26 The
Ashcroft Court also left no doubt that the harm of creation—that is, the
sexual exploitation and abuse of children to produce child pornography—is
the touchstone of its child pornography doctrine. It noted that its analysis
in previous cases about the state interests outweighing private interests ‘‘was
based on how [an image] was made, not on what it communicated.’’27
Ashcroft clarified that virtual child pornography is so different from real
child pornography that it is not exempt from First Amendment protection.
But it explicitly left open the question whether images depicting real
children, but created without sexual molestation or exploitation, are suffi-
ciently similar to real child pornography to be exempt from First Amend-
ment protection. The Court declined to reach the question whether
morphed computer images—that is, sexually explicit images of children
created by ‘‘alter[ing] innocent pictures of real children so that the children
appear to be engaged in sexual activity’’28—were also entitled to First
Amendment protection. The Court did, however, note that morphed
images ‘‘implicate the interests of real children and are in that sense closer
to the images in Ferber.’’29
In the wake of Ashcroft, most courts have decided that images depicting
real children, but created without sexual molestation or exploitation,
still qualify as child pornography.30 Many courts have interpreted child
26. Id. at 250 (noting that the Osborne opinion had identified a government interest ‘‘in
preventing child pornography from being used as an aid in the solicitation of minors,’’ but
stated the Osborne Court had ‘‘anchored its holding in the concern for the participants’’ and
‘‘did not suggest that, absent this concern, other governmental interests would suffice’’).
The Court also rejected the government argument that ‘‘virtual child pornography whets
the appetites of pedophiles and encourages them to engage in illegal conduct,’’ noting that
‘‘[t]he mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for
banning it.’’ Id. at 253.
27. Id. at 250–51.
28. Id. at 242.
29. Id.
30. See Amy Adler, The ‘‘Dost Test’’ in Child Pornography Law: ‘‘Trial by Rorschach Test,’’
in REFINING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW: CRIME, LANGUAGE, AND SOCIAL CON-
SEQUENCES 85 (C.B. Hessick ed., 2016) (noting that ‘‘lower courts have expanded the
definition of child pornography since Ferber and Ashcroft in a way that makes the category
less and less connected to the problem child abuse as the Supreme Court envisioned’’).
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pornography laws to include images that are the result of surreptitious
filming or photographing.31 Courts have decided that morphed computer
images also qualify as child pornography and are not entitled to First
Amendment protection.32 Perhaps most controversially,33 courts have
upheld convictions based on sexually explicit images that minors created
of themselves—a practice sometimes referred to as ‘‘sexting.’’ Some states
have even prosecuted the minors who created the images of themselves.34
But not all judges have taken this view. When the Washington Supreme
Court recently upheld a teenager’s conviction for sexting, it did so over the
vigorous dissent of Justice Gordon McCloud.35 Justice McCloud argued
that it was ‘‘absurd’’ to read Washington’s child pornography statute,
which ‘‘was specifically intended to protect children depicted in pornogra-
phy,’’ for creating ‘‘depictions of themselves.’’36 And although the Kansas
Court of Appeals has previously held that ‘‘morphed’’ child pornography is
not protected by the First Amendment,37 a recent decision from that court
signaled that its judges may be open to revisiting that decision.38
31. E.g., United States v. Klug, 670 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Johnson,
639 F.3d 433 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Stewart, 839 F. Supp. 2d 914, 925–26 (E.D.
Mich. 2012) (‘‘[A] child may still be exploited even without knowingly participating in the
taking of the photograph.’’). But see State v. Gates, 182 Ariz. 459, 465, 897 P.2d 1345, 1351 (Ct.
App. 1994).
32. E.g., United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Ramos,
685 F.3d 120, 134 (2d Cir. 2012); see also Doe v. Boland, 630 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2011). But see
People v. Gerber, 196 Cal. App. 4th 368, 386 (2011) (‘‘Although we may find such altered
images morally repugnant, we conclude that mere possession of them remains protected by
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.’’); Parker v. State, 81 So. 3d 451
(Fla. App. 2011) (holding that manual cutting and pasting of photographs of children’s heads
onto sexually explicit images featuring adults did not meet the state statutory definition of
child pornography).
33. See, e.g., Emily Shaaya, States Address the Disconnect: Teens in a Sext-Crazed Culture,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Summer 2012, at 18; Editorial, ‘Sexting’ Overreach, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR (Apr. 28, 2009), at 8.
34. See, e.g., State v. Gray, 402 P.3d 254 (Wash. 2017); A.H. v. State, 949 So.2d 234 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2007); see also John A. Humbach, ‘Sexting’ and the First Amendment, 37
HASTINGS L.J. 433, 433–35 (2010) (collecting cases).
35. State v. Gray, 402 P.3d 254 (Wash. 2017).
36. Id. at 262 (2017) (McCloud, J., dissenting).
37. State v. Coburn, 176 P.3d 203 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008).
38. State v. Langston, 404 P.3d 362, 2017 WL 4558573 at *12 (Kan. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2017)
(‘‘A reasonable argument can be made that a statute that goes beyond the prohibition of
images created by harming children through sexual exploitation or abuse to a prohibition of
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I I . RECENT EXPANS IONS
Although reasonable judges can disagree over whether sexting images and
morphed images are entitled to First Amendment protection, two states
recently expanded the definition of child pornography much further. These
expansions are very difficult to square with the Supreme Court’s decisions
in this area.
A. New Jersey
In 2017, the New Jersey Legislature amended its child pornography statute to
include images that fall far outside of the traditional definition of child
pornography. Like other states, New Jersey previously defined child pornog-
raphy to include images ‘‘depict[ing] a child engaging in a prohibited sex
act.’’39 It now defines child pornography to include not only images depict-
ing sex acts, but also images ‘‘portray[ing] a child in a sexually suggestive
manner.’’40 The statute contains the following definition of the latter term:
‘‘Portray a child in a sexually suggestive manner’’ means:
(a) to depict a child’s less than completely and opaquely covered intimate
parts, as defined in N.J.S.2C:14-1, in a manner that, by means of the
initially innocent images in which the children weren’t harmed in making the images does
infringe on constitutionally protected speech.’’). The Kansas court did not reach the issue,
however, because the defendant raised it as part of an overbreadth claim that failed to
establish that ‘‘a significant part of the conduct’’ the Kansas child pornography statute
targeted were images that were created without sexual exploitation or abuse. Id. at *12–*13.
39. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(b)(1). The statute defines a ‘‘prohibited sex act’’ as:
(a) Sexual intercourse; or







(i) Nudity, if depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any
person who may view such depiction; or
(j) Any act of sexual penetration or sexual contact
Id.
40. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(b)(1).
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posing, composition, format, or animated sensual details, emits
sensuality with sufficient impact to concentrate prurient interest on
the child; or
(b) to depict any form of contact with a child’s intimate parts, as defined
in N.J.S.2C:14-1, in a manner that, by means of the posing,
composition, format, or animated sensual details, emits sensuality
with sufficient impact to concentrate prurient interest on the child; or
(c) to otherwise depict a child for the purpose of sexual stimulation or
gratification of any person who may view the depiction where the
depiction does not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.41
Subsection (c) expands child pornography well beyond its traditional def-
inition.42 Child pornography statutes ordinarily prohibit depictions of
sexual intercourse, bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or
lewd or lascivious exhibition of the genitals.43 Subsection (c) defines child
pornography, not in terms of whether it depicts some sort of sexual activity,
but rather in terms of the reaction the image is meant to evoke. The statute
is thus remarkably broad, and the prohibition is based entirely on subjec-
tive (rather than objective) criteria.44
New Jersey is not the first jurisdiction to use subjective criteria to define
child pornography. When trying to determine whether an image falls
41. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(b)(1).
42. Subsection (c) is not the only problematic part of this statute. Subsections (a) and (b)
are arguably unconstitutionally vague. The phrase ‘‘emits sensuality with sufficient impact
to concentrate prurient interest on the child’’ does not give individuals notice about what
is likely to satisfy this standard and what is not. Cf. Rabeck v. New York, 391 U.S. 462
(1968) (striking down as unconstitutionally vague a statute prohibiting the sale of ‘‘any . . .
magazines . . . which would appeal to the lust of persons under the age of eighteen years or to
their curiosity as to sex or to the anatomical differences between the sexes’’). But at least one
New Jersey Court has rejected a vagueness challenge to this language. See State v. Seigel, 139
N.J. Super. 373, 381–82 (Law. Div. 1975).
43. This is the definition from both Ferber and the current federal statute. N.Y. Penal
Law § 263.00(1), 263.00(3), 263.00(4) (McKinney 1980); 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)–(E). The
Supreme Court appears to have affirmed the constitutionality of this definition sub silentio
in Ferber.
44. To be sure, the statute exempts images that ‘‘have serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value.’’ Whether an image possesses such value is arguably objective—namely,
a question whether a reasonable person would find such value, rather than whether the
person who possesses the image finds such value. But even if this limitation is framed in
objective terms, the prohibition itself is framed in subjective terms.
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within the federal prohibition of the lascivious display of a minor’s genitals,
some federal courts have relied on a series of factors called the Dost test.45
The Dost test asks
1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child’s genitalia or
pubic area; 2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is sexually sug-
gestive, i.e., in a place or pose generally associated with sexual activity; 3)
whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, or in inappropriate attire,
considering the age of the child; 4) whether the child is fully or partially
clothed, or nude; 5) whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or
a willingness to engage in sexual activity; 6) whether the visual depiction is
intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.46
The sixth Dost factor—‘‘whether the visual depiction is intended or de-
signed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer’’—has sometimes been
interpreted as speaking only to the content of an image.47 But other courts
have interpreted it to encompass an inquiry into the subjective thoughts of
the creator or possessor.48 In other words, some federal courts have con-
sidered the subjective views of particular individuals as one factor in decid-
ing whether a particular image qualifies as child pornography.
As Amy Adler has explained, this subjective focus is deeply problematic.
It dilutes the category of child pornography, detracting attention (and
perhaps resources) from images that were created through horrific abuse.49
45. For a very persuasive critique of the Dost test, see Amy Adler, Inverting the First
Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921 (2001) [hereinafter Adler, Inverting].
46. United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D.Cal.1986), aff’d 813 F.2d 1231 (9th
Cir.1987) (unpublished table decision). Although the Dost test has been the subject of
criticism, see United States v. Rivera, 546 F.3d 245, 250–52 (2d Cir. 2008) (collecting sources),
it remains popular with lower courts, see Adler, Inverting, supra note 45, at 953 (‘‘Virtually all
lower courts that have addressed the issue have embraced the so-called ‘Dost test.’’’).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 122 (3d Cir. 1989) (‘‘We must . . . look
at the photograph, rather than the viewer,’’ because if ‘‘we were to conclude that the
photographs were lascivious merely because [the viewer] found them sexually arousing, we
would be engaging in conclusory bootstrapping rather than the task at hand—a legal
analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence of lasciviousness.’’).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 579 F.3d 672, 683–84 (6th Cir. 2009) (adopting
a ‘‘limited context test’’ that ‘‘permits consideration of the context in which the images were
taken’’); see also Adler, Inverting, supra note 45, at 954 n.149 (‘‘Courts have wavered on the
question of whether the focus must be on the audience, the photographer, or both.’’).
49. Adler, supra note 30, at 95–96.
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It may be constitutionally vague because it is so unpredictable.50 And it
‘‘threatens to turn child pornography law into a thought crime.’’51 If what
matters is what a person thinks about an image, rather than how the image
was created, then the law is no longer focused on whether a child was
harmed. Given that child pornography is exempted from First Amendment
protection because of the harm suffered by children,52 the subjective focus
raises constitutional concerns.
The New Jersey statute goes even further than the Dost test. While the
Dost test considers subjective thoughts of a creator or possessor as one of six
factors, the New Jersey statute makes subjective thoughts the sole test of
criminality. That is not to say a subjective factor can never serve as the
dividing line between legal and illegal behavior.53 But where, as here, the
dividing line is between illegal behavior and constitutionally protected behav-
ior, it seems as though more should be required than simply a subjective
purpose.54 That is especially so here because the New Jersey statute applies
to essentially any depiction of a child so long as the purpose of the image is
the ‘‘sexual stimulation or gratification of any person who may view the
depiction.’’ The statute exempts only depictions with ‘‘serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value.’’ Nudity is not required.55
An example may help to illustrate how broad this statute is, and how
heavily it relies on subjective intent. Imagine an individual who is sexually
attracted to children, and who finds photographs of children bundled up in
50. Id. at 94.
51. Id. at 95.
52. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1586 (2010) (explaining that Ferber
recognized the exception for child pornography because ‘‘[t]he market for child pornog-
raphy was ‘intrinsically related’ to the underlying abuse, and was therefore ‘an integral part
of the production of such materials, an activity illegal throughout the Nation’’’) (internal
citations omitted).
53. Obstruction of justice, for example, has often been thought to criminalize otherwise
legal behavior, such as shredding documents, if done with ‘‘corrupt intent.’’ See Arthur
Anderson LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (holding that document shredded, if
done without corrupt intent, is legal).
54. Cf. United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (presuming a scienter
requirement for a statutory element that distinguished between illegal activity and consti-
tutionally protected activity because, inter alia, a statute without such a scienter requirement
would raise ‘‘serious constitutional doubts’’).
55. Although there is reason to doubt that the Supreme Court would approve of a child
pornography definition that included clothed children, there are several lower court cases
saying that nudity is not constitutionally required. See Adler, supra note 30, at 86 & n.42.
EXPANSION OF CH ILD PORNOGRAPHY LAW | 331
winter coats to be sexually stimulating.56 If that individual takes a picture
of a child walking down the street who is wearing a coat, then the New
Jersey statute would classify that picture as child pornography. All that
matters is whether the image ‘‘depict[s] a child,’’ whether the individual
who created the image had ‘‘the purpose of sexual stimulation,’’ and
whether the resulting image had no ‘‘serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.’’ All three of those factors are met by the example.
As the winter coat example illustrates, the New Jersey statute crimina-
lizes the viewpoint of the individual who took the picture. It does not
matter that the child was not harmed in the creation of the image or that
the child will suffer no privacy invasion or reputational harm if the image is
shared with others.57 All that matters is how the potential defendant views
the image of the child.
B. Texas
While New Jersey’s recent expansion of child pornography law came from
the legislature, Texas’s expansion came from the courts. In 2017, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals upheld a conviction for an individual based on
his possession of a portion of a Robert Mapplethorpe photograph.58 The
Texas court relied on the Dost factors, rather than any concept of harm to
the child depicted, to affirm a conviction that was clearly the result of
a prosecution based on suspicion that the defendant was sexually attracted
to children, rather than any harmful content of the images he possessed.
On Valentine’s Day, 2014, a librarian saw Mark Bolles using a library
computer to view what appeared to be ‘‘partially clothed’’ children on the
internet.59 The library alerted the FBI.60 The FBI sent an agent to the
library, where the agent observed Bolles taking photographs on his cell
phone of images on the computer.61 The FBI agent convinced Bolles to
56. See United States v. Steen, 634 F.3d 822, 829 (5th Cir. 2011) (Higgenbotham, J.,
concurring) (‘‘A pedophile may be aroused by photos of children at a bus stop wearing
winter coats, but these are not pornographic.’’); see also Adler, Inverting, supra note 45, at 943
n.99 (documenting pedophilic interest in children wearing winter coats).
57. These are the two reasons that the Supreme Court has given for why child pornography
is exempted from First Amendment protection. See generally Hessick, Limits, supra note 19.
58. State v. Bolles, __ S.W.3d __, 2017 WL 4675659 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2017).
59. Id. at *1.
60. Bolles v. State, 512 S.W.3d 456, 458 (Tex. App. 2016).
61. 512 S.W.3d at 458.
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surrender his phone to him, and a subsequent inspection revealed several
nude or partially nude pictures, including what appeared to be a picture of
Bolles’ genitalia, that led to his indictment.62
Bolles was indicted on three counts of possession of child pornography.
Count 3 was dismissed by the state before trial, after prosecutors concluded
that the photo in question depicted an adult, rather than a minor.63 Count
2 was for an image of a young nude girl touching her breast. The defendant
was acquitted on this count at trial.64 And Count 1 was based on a cropped
portion of the Mapplethorpe photo. Bolles was convicted only of Count 1,
the count associated with the partial Mapplethorpe photo, and he appealed
his conviction on this count.65
Before addressing the arguments raised on appeal, it is worth describ-
ing, in detail, the Mapplethorpe photograph and the cropped image that
Bolles created. The Mapplethorpe photograph, which is titled ‘‘Rosie,’’
shows a young girl sitting on a stone bench.66 The girl is wearing a dress,
but because her knees are bent and her feet propped up on the bench
in front of her, the viewer can see that she is not wearing underwear.
A portion of her labia majora is visible in the shadow of her dress. Bolles
cropped the Mapplethorpe photograph to create a close up image of the
girl’s labia.67
Bolles convinced the intermediate appellate court to reverse his conviction
on Count 1.68 The intermediate appellate court may have sided with Bolles
because the government argued not only that Bolles’ cropped portion of the
Mapplethorpe photo was illegal child pornography, but also that the original
Mapplethorpe photograph, in its entirety, depicted a lewd exhibition of the
62. 512 S.W.3d at 459. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated that there were
‘‘several images of what appeared to be [Bolles’s] own penis’’ on the cell phone. State v.
Bolles, __ S.W.3d __, 2017 WL 4675659, at *2. But the intermediate court state that there
was ‘‘one image of appellant’s face and penis.’’ 512 S.W.3d at 459. I can find no explanation
for the discrepancy.
63. __ S.W.3d __-, 2017 WL 4675659, at *2.
64. __ S.W.3d __, 2017 WL 4675659, at *2.
65. __ S.W.3d __, 2017 WL 4675659, at *1.
66. The image can be viewed here: http://archive.is/kjUer.
67. State v. Bolles, __S.W.3d __, 2017 WL 4675659, at *2. In its description of the
photography, the trial court said that the child’s ‘‘vagina is visible.’’ Id. at *1. That
description is anatomically inaccurate.
68. Bolles v. State, 512 S.W.3d 456 (Tex. App. 2016).
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genitals.69 In other words, the state argued that the original Mapplethorpe
photograph, which hangs in the Guggenheim museum,70 is child pornog-
raphy. The intermediate appellate court rejected this argument.
The state made another remarkable argument before the intermediate
appellate court. The state argued that, if the court concluded the full
photograph was not lewd, then ‘‘an issue arises regarding when the cropped
image was ‘made.’’’ More specifically, the state argued that if only the new,
cropped image is lewd, then the cropped image might not fall within the
statute’s prohibition. The statute prohibits certain material depicting ‘‘a
child younger than 18 years of age at the time the image of the child was
made.’’71 The child depicted in the 1976 Mapplethorpe photograph was
doubtlessly older than 18 when the cropped image was ‘‘made’’ in 2014, and
thus the state appears to have argued that the original Mapplethorpe pho-
tograph was lewd in order to avoid a possible argument that the new,
cropped image fell outside the text of the statute. Oddly, the defendant
doesn’t appear to have made this argument; the state volunteered it.72 And
although the state also argued to the intermediate appellate court ‘‘that the
better argument is that the cropped image was also ‘made’ in 1976 when the
photograph was taken,’’73 the state didn’t offer any support for what it
claimed was the ‘‘better’’ reading of the statute.74 And, having raised an
argument against its own interest, the state inadvertently convinced the
intermediate appellate court that the cropped image fell outside of the
statutory prohibition. The intermediate appellate court reversed the con-
viction on Count 1 on the grounds that the child depicted in the cropped
photo was not under 18 when Bolles created the cropped image. Because it
found that the cropped image fell outside the statute, the intermediate
appellate court did not discuss whether the image was lewd.75
69. 512 S.W.3d at 463–65. Not only did the State argue that the Mapplethorpe picture
was lewd under the Dost factors, but it also encouraged the court to conclude ‘‘that
Mapplethorpe intended to invoke a sexual response of some kind’’ when he created the
image, and that Mapplethorpe ‘‘coached’’ the little girl in the image to expose her gentiles
for the photograph. Id. at 463.
70. Bolles v. State, 512 S.W.3d 456, 459 (Tex. App. 2016).
71. Tex. Penal Code Ann 43.26(a) (emphasis added).
72. Bolles v. State, 512 S.W.3d 456, 466 (Tex. App. 2016).
73. 512 S.W.3d at 466.
74. Id.
75. Bolles v. State, 512 S.W.3d 456, 466 (Tex. App. 2016) (‘‘Whether or not the cropped
image depicts a lewd exhibition of the genitals—an issue we express no opinion on—
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The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed.76 First, the Court of
Criminal Appeals concluded that the conviction on Court 1 ‘‘was based
only on Appellant’s possession of the zoomed-in cropped image of the
child’s genitals.’’77 Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeals did not revisit
the intermediate appellate court’s analysis about whether the original Map-
plethorpe photograph was lewd. Instead the Court of Criminal Appeals
focused on the argument that the girl depicted was older that 18 when
Bolles ‘‘made’’ the cropped image. It concluded that the cropping of the
Mapplethorpe photograph did not change the age of the child depicted for
statutory purposes, and it then conducted a Dost analysis and held that the
cropped image was lewd.78
a reasonable jury could not conclude that it depicts a person who was under the age of 18 ‘at
the time the image was made.’’’).
76. State v. Bolles, __S.W.3d __, 2017 WL 4675659 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 18, 2017).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is the court of last resort for criminal defendants in
Texas.
77. Id. at *2.
78. The Dost analysis was relatively perfunctory. It analyzed only the cropped image, and
clearly indicated that the cropped image was quite different than and separate from, the
original Mapplethorpe:
First, the child’s genital area is the focal point of the cropped image. There is very little else
in the image to view except the child’s genitals. Regarding the second and third factors,
since the image is of only the child’s genital area, it could be viewed as unnatural and
sexually suggestive. The genitals are exposed and the child’s legs are clearly apart. Creating
an image of only the child’s genitals in this pose is definitely sexually suggestive. Fourth,
since the image is a close-up of the child’s genitals, it is an image depicting a child who is at
least partially nude. The fifth factor, whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or
a willingness to engage in sexual activity, can be presumed because of how the image was
manipulated—although little can be seen of the child’s legs, they appear to be spread apart.
Finally, the visual depiction created by Appellant appears to have been intended and
designed by Appellant to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.
As the court stated in United States v. McCall, ‘‘it is the depiction—not the minor—that
must bring forth the genitals or pubic area to excite or stimulate.’’ Thus, the context of the
making of the cropped image and the composition of the image, as cropped, can factor into
this evaluation. The magnified cropped image is not a work of art hanging in a museum or
depicted in books containing Robert Mapplethorpe’s work. The magnified and cropped
image is a picture of a child’s genitals, legs spread open. We find that this image constitutes
a ‘‘lewd exhibition’’ of her genitals. It would be difficult to conclude otherwise since all six
Dost factors have been satisfied.
State v. Bolles, No. PD-0791-16, 2017 WL 4675659, at *12 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 18,
2017).
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Importantly, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did not disturb the
intermediate court’s finding that the original Mapplethorpe photograph
was not lewd. Implicit in this decision is that the child depicted was not
subject to sexual abuse or exploitation when Mapplethorpe took the pho-
tograph in 1976. The child depicted was not suddenly subject to abuse or
exploitation when Bolles cropped the photograph in 2014. Nor was she
subject to any additional privacy harm when the image was cropped. The
original Mapplethorpe photograph included a depiction of her genitalia
because of how she was sitting on the bench and because she was not
wearing underwear. It is true that the cropped image showed only her
genitalia, and not the other portions of the original Mapplethorpe photo-
graph. But it is entirely unclear how cropping the image changes the
privacy interests of the child depicted. The cropped image does not show
anything more than the original photograph shows. And one could achieve
the same effect that Bolles did in cropping the image by using a magnifying
glass to look at the original photograph.
To be sure, Bolles is not the first case to hold that a defendant’s cropping
of an image could create child pornography, even when the original image
did not constitute child pornography.79 For example, in United States v.
Stewart,80 the defendant cropped pictures in such a way as to make the
child’s genitalia the ‘‘focal point of the images.’’81 Although the govern-
ment conceded that the initial, larger images (photographs of young girls
swimming naked at a beach) did not meet the definition of child pornog-
raphy,82 the court held that the defendant’s decision to crop the photo-
graphs rendered the new photographs lascivious and thus child
pornography.83 But Bolles may be the most striking of these decisions as
it involves an actual work of art.
79. There are a number of lower court decisions stating that the cropping of images or
focusing in on a specific area may be appropriately considered in the question of lascivi-
ousness. E.g., United States v. Brown, 579 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Freeman, 808 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Dauray, 76 F. Supp. 2d 191,
196–97 (D. Conn. 1999).
80. 839 F. Supp. 2d 914 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
81. Id. at 923.
82. Id. at 922.
83. Id. at 923–24. Interestingly, the court appears to have thought that cropping was
relevant to the sixth Dost factor. See id. at 923 (‘‘The jury properly could infer that the image
was intended to elicit a sexual response in the viewer because of how it was cropped and
where it was located on the defendant’s computer.’’)
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I I I . A CR I T ICAL V IEW OF EXPANS ION
The New Jersey statute and the Bolles case from Texas share an important
similarity—both focus on a defendant’s sexual interest in children, rather
than harm to children. Indeed, much of the modern approach to child
pornography law can be said to do the same. Not only has the definition of
child pornography changed to include images that were created without
any harm to the child depicted, but enforcement efforts also appear dis-
proportionately to target those who consume child pornography, rather
than those who create child pornography or otherwise sexually abuse chil-
dren. This section explains why the harm to children ought to be the
primary focus of child pornography law, and of law enforcement efforts
more generally.
A. The Shift from Harm to Sexual Interest
In creating the child pornography exception to the First Amendment, the
Supreme Court stressed that child pornography harms children. In partic-
ular, it stressed that children are harmed in the creation of child pornog-
raphy,84 and that harm is exacerbated by the circulation of the images,
which serve as a ‘‘permanent record’’ of the abuse the child suffered in the
image’s creation.85 For example, the Ferber Court framed the harms of
child pornography in terms of an ‘‘intrinsic relationship’’ between the
distribution of child pornography and child sex exploitation and abuse.
This relationship led the Court to conclude that the only effective way to
end the harm of creation was to shut down the distribution network of
child pornography.86 And in Ashcroft, the Court characterized its decisions
to allow child pornography prosecutions as a judgement ‘‘based on how
[child pornography] was made, not on what it communicated.’’87
Neither the New Jersey statute nor the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
decision in Bolles can be justified based on harm to children. The New
Jersey statute does not require that the child be engaged in any particular
84. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758.
85. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759
86. ‘‘[T]he distribution network for child pornography must be closed if the production
of material which requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled.’’
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759.
87. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 234, 250–51 (2002).
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activity or even appear nude; all that matters is how others view the
image—namely, whether a defendant views the child depicted as a source
of ‘‘sexual stimulation or gratification.’’88 Nor is the Bolles decision pred-
icated on any type of harm to the child depicted. The young girl was not
harmed by Mapplethorpe’s original photography; and Bolles’ subsequent
decision to zoom in on one portion of that photograph does not retroac-
tively cause any harm to her.
Changing child pornography law so that it is no longer predicated
on harm to children may cause constitutional problems. It expands the
definition of child pornography ‘‘in a way that makes the category less
and less connected to the problem [of] child abuse as the Supreme
Court envisioned.’’89 The Supreme Court has said child pornography
falls outside of the First Amendment only because of the harm it causes
to children.90 Images that cause no harm thus may be entitled to
constitutional protection.91
In addition to the fact that the New Jersey images and the image from
Bolles cause no harm, they appear to punish based on whether defendants
are sexually attracted to children, rather than the content of the images
themselves. The New Jersey statute is quite explicit about this: What
separates images of children that are permitted from those that are prohib-
ited is the subjective reaction the image is meant to evoke.92
The Bolles Court purported to base its punishment decision on more
than just subjective factors—it found that the cropped image satisfied
several objective Dost factors, as well as the subjective factor.93 But there
is little doubt that the initial investigation and prosecution of Mark Bolles
was based on his perceived sexual interest in children, rather than the
content of the images he possessed. He came to the attention of law
88. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(b)(1).
89. Adler, supra note 30, at 85.
90. See supra notes 19–27, 84–87, and accompanying text.
91. See generally Hessick, Limits, supra note 19. See also Adler, supra note 30, at 95 (‘‘[I]t is
in my view an open constitutional question whether such harm standing along would suffice
to deem an image ‘child pornography’ as a constitutional matter. The Court’s jurisprudence
is simply unclear on this point and there are significant reasons to suspect that the kind of
harm caused by these images is simply too far afield from the abuse-in-production harm that
is the foundation of child pornography law.’’)
92. See supra text accompanying notes 41–44.
93. See supra note 78.
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enforcement because a librarian was concerned that Bolles was using
a library computer to view images of ‘‘what looked like partially clothed
individuals.’’94 He was charged not only for possessing the cropped image,
but also for possessing what ultimately proved to be an image of an adult
and a non-pornographic image of a girl.95 These other charges suggest that
prosecutors were not particularly careful about the content of the images
Bolles possessed. They were instead concerned about his interest in par-
tially clothed children. And the court’s inclusion of the fact that Bolles also
had a picture of his penis on his cellphone96—a fact that is irrelevant to the
legal question in the case—was presumably included in order to signal that
Bolles found these images sexually stimulating.
Put simply, these two expansions shift child pornography law from a tool
to prevent harm to children to a tool that punishes based on a defendant’s
thoughts towards children. As Amy Adler explains:
Child pornography has become a thought crime. Quite simply, we do not
like the way people think about certain pictures of children. This is evident
in the ever-expanding definition of ‘‘lascivious exhibition of the genitals’’
and the attempt of courts and legislatures, . . . to police pictures that appeal
to the sexual fantasies of pedophiles, regardless of how those pictures were
produced.97
Adler explains why this focus on a defendant’s fantasies is inconsistent with
First Amendment principles.98 A focus on fantasies rather than harm is also
inconsistent with Aschroft’s rejection of protecting future victims of child
sex abuse as a sufficient reason to criminalize child pornography.99 But
there are also practical reasons to oppose the shift in child pornography law
from harm to sexual thoughts—namely, that it is unlikely to actually
protect children from sexual abuse.
B. Child Pornography and Preventing Abuse
As the Supreme Court explained in Osborne v. Ohio, the criminalization of
child pornography possession is justified because those who possess child
94. Bolles, 512 S.W.3d at 458.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 63–65.
96. See supra note 62.
97. Adler, Inverting, supra note 45, at 995.
98. Id. at 970–95.
99. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. 234, 250 (2002).
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pornography create a market for its creation.100 If no one sought to possess
child pornography, so the argument goes, then children would not be
abused in order to create it.101 Modern law enforcement has taken this
market theory seriously. Prosecutors have significantly increased the vol-
ume of child pornography possession cases that they bring.102 In doing so,
they have said that they are protecting children not only because they are
drying up the market for child pornography, but also because those who
possess child pornography are also like to have also molested a child103 or
are likely to do so in the future.104
There is no doubt that the possession of child pornography should be
prohibited and punished. But we should not pretend that child pornogra-
phy prosecutions are an effective means of protecting children from sexual
abuse. That is because the market theory of child pornography does not
hold up to scrutiny, and because the category of people who possess child
pornography is both over- and under-inclusive of the group of individuals
who actually pose a physical threat to children.
100. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990).
101. SUZANNE OST, CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND SEXUAL GROOMING: LEGAL AND
SOCIETAL RESPONSES 114–15 (2009) (collecting sources making this argument).
102. See Hessick, Questioning, supra note 2, at 148 tbl.1.
103. As I have previously documented:
There are a number of examples where government officials tacitly acknowledge that child
pornography laws are being used as a proxy for punishing child sex abusers. They often
appear in the guise of statements that possessors of child pornography also have a history of
contact offenses or statements noting how difficult it is to detect or prosecute child sex
abuse cases. Such statements, when made in support of longer sentences for possession of
child pornography, indicate that lawmakers are using pornography prosecutions as an
alternative to sex abuse prosecutions. If possessors were being punished only for viewing
these images, such statements would be irrelevant. Other public officials are more direct,
making statements that refer to possessors of child pornography as ‘‘predators’’ or in other
terms that suggest contact offenses.
Hessick, Disentangling, supra note 1, at 882.
104. See, e.g., YAMAN AKDENIZ, INTERNET CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 11 (2008) (quoting the Explanatory Memo-
randum of the Council of Europe’s Cybercrime Convention 2001); WILLIAM A. STAN-
MEYER, THE SEDUCTION OF SOCIETY: PORNOGRAPHY AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN LIFE
81 (1984); Janis Wolak et al., National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, Child-
Pornography Possessors Arrested in Internet-Related Crimes: Findings from the National Juvenile
Online Victimization Study 34 (2005), available at http://unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/jvq/CV81.pdf.
340 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 21 | NO . 3 | SUMMER 2018
There is significant reason to doubt the market theory argument. In
particular, the market theory is problematic because the distribution
channels for child pornography do not function as a commercial market:
those who create and distribute child pornography do not make a profit,
but instead appear to be motivated by a desire for status.105 Because those
who produce child pornography are not motivated by economic gain, the
standard market theory that eliminating demand will eventually reduce
the supply does not necessarily apply. Indeed, those who champion the
market theory do not rely on any empirical evidence that arresting and
prosecuting possessors has affected the production of child pornography;
instead they simply rely on the logical appeal of the standard economic
argument.106
The claim that defendants who possess child pornography are likely to
have molested a child in the past or to do so in the future is similarly
unsupported by available evidence. To be sure, some individuals who
possess child pornography have also molested a child. But the population
of individuals who possess child pornography includes large numbers of
people who have never had sexual contact with a child, and many indivi-
duals who sexually molest children appear not to collect child pornogra-
phy.107 As Melissa Hamilton explains, ‘‘child molesters and child
pornography offenders are two groups with occasional overlap in
membership.’’108
Given that child pornography distribution does not function as a market,
and given that child pornography prosecutions are not particularly likely to
snare child molesters, an enforcement strategy focused on child pornography
possession is unlikely to actually protect children from sexual abuse. Not
only are child pornography cases unlikely to protect children from sexual
abuse standing alone, but harsh child pornography laws also create perverse
incentives for law enforcement to pursue pornography cases rather than sex
abuse cases. That is because child sex abuse cases are more difficult to
prosecute than possession of child pornography cases. For one thing, child
105. See PHILIP JENKINS, BEYOND TOLERANCE: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE
INTERNET 91 (2001); OST, supra note 101, at 113.
106. See OST, supra note 101, at 116.
107. See Hessick, Questioning, supra note 2, at 152–54; Hessick, Disentangling, supra note
1, at 870-86.
108. Melissa Hamilton, The Efficacy of Severe Child Pornography Sentencing: Empirical
Validity or Political Rhetoric?, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 545, 580–81 (2011).
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sex abuse is more difficult to detect than are child pornography crimes.109
For another, once child sex abuse is detected, there are evidentiary problems
associated with pursuing many child sex abuse cases. Prosecutors often lack
physical evidence, worry about the credibility of child witnesses, or must
overcome the unwillingness of the victim’s family to have their child to suffer
through the trauma of a trial.110 Similar issues rarely arise in possession of
child pornography cases; once law enforcement obtains a warrant and seizes
an offender’s computer, the prosecution essentially has all the evidence it
needs to obtain a conviction.111 There is no need to worry about victim
credibility or about a victim’s unwillingness to testify.
109. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sexual Assault of Young Children as Reported to
Law Enforcement: Victim, Incident, and Offender Characteristics (2000), at 11, http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf [hereinafter, Sexual Assault of Young Chil-
dren] (reporting a 27% arrest rate); Tim Tate, Child Pornography: An Investigation 109–10
(1990) (suggesting that only 1% of all child sex abusers are ‘‘caught and sentenced’’). Child
sex abuse is difficult to detect because it ordinarily occurs in private spaces, see Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Sexual Assault of Young Children as Reported to Law Enforcement:
Victim, Incident, and Offender Characteristics 6 (2000), and because offenders threaten
their victims into silence, see, e.g., TILMAN FURNIS, THE MULTI-PROFESSIONAL HANDBOOK
OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 24, 39 (1991). In contrast, law enforcement can detect those who
possess child pornography by tracing IP addresses of those who visit pornographic sites, or
by engaging in sting operations. Cf. Wolak et al., supra note 104 (reporting that 43% of U.S.
child pornography possession cases in 2000 ‘‘originated with investigations by law
enforcement’’).
110. For example, in 2006 federal prosecutors declined to prosecute more than half of the
child sex abuse cases that were referred to them, as opposed to only a 38% declination rate
for child pornography referrals, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL PROSECUTION
OF CHILD SEX EXPLOITATION OFFENDERS, 2006, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/fpcseo06.pdf, at tbl. 2, and the reasons given for declining prosecution were
more likely to be concerns about weak evidence in child sex abuse cases than in child
pornography cases, id. at 3 (‘‘More than half of sex abuse declinations were due to weak
evidence. In comparison, weak evidence was stated as the reason for 24% of declinations for
child pornography and 20% of declinations for sex transportation.’’). More recent federal
reports no longer report child sex abuse offenses alongside child pornography data, so it is
hard to tell the extent to which these patterns continue. Compare id. (reporting data for
child pornography, child sex abuse, and child sex transportation), with BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, supra note 2 (reporting data for child pornography production, child por-
nography possession/receipt/distribution, and child sex trafficking).
111. See Dan Herbeck, Child Porn Suspect Faces Risk with Trial, THE BUFFALO NEWS,
Dec. 6, 2009 (reporting high levels of plea bargains for child pornography possession, and
noting that the few defendants who proceed to trial are almost always convicted).
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Importantly, the expansion of child pornography law in New Jersey and
Texas may make child pornography prosecutions even more attractive to law
enforcement than sex abuse prosecutions. By relaxing the definition of what
qualifies as child pornography, these states have made it even easier for
prosecutors to obtain a conviction for possession of child pornography.112
Because child sex abuse is a much more serious crime than possession of
child pornography,113 one might assume that law enforcement would
never prioritize child pornography cases over cases involving actual child
sex abuse. Unfortunately, that assumption is false. Arizona, which has the
country’s toughest child pornography laws, actively pursued harsh sen-
tences against possessors of child pornography offenders while failing to
investigate reports of child sex abuse. While prosecutors were seeking 200-
year sentences for defendants accused of possessing child pornography,114
law enforcement was failing to conduct even rudimentary investigations
into dozens of child sex abuse allegations.115 As the Associated Press re-
ported in 2011, law enforcement failed to investigate 32 reported child
molestations from one community despite the fact that ‘‘suspects were
known in all but six cases.’’116
To be sure, the Arizona example does not prove that all law enforcement
will necessarily prioritize child pornography offenses above child sex abuse
cases. But it is far from the only example of law enforcement filing to
investigate contact sex offenses, as opposed to proxy crimes like pornogra-
phy. Child pornography prosecutions allow law enforcement to signal that
they are working to protect children without having to take on messy
contact cases. And as law enforcement increasingly reports enforcement
112. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
519–20 (2001) (explaining that when legislatures create a new crime that is easier to prove
than an existing crime, it allows prosecutors to engage in ‘‘informal adjudication’’ and use
the new crime to punish those they suspect of the existing crime).
113. See Hessick, Disentangling, supra note 1, at 865–70.
114. See Arizona v. Berger, 134 P.3d 378 (Ariz. 2006) (affirming a 200-year sentence for
possession of child pornography).
115. ‘‘[M]ore than 400 sex-crimes reported to Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s
office during a three-year period ending in 2007—including dozens of alleged child moles-
tations—that were inadequately investigated and in some instances were not worked at all,
according to current and former police officers familiar with the cases.’’ Jacques Billeaud,
Critics: ‘Tough’ sheriff botched sex-crime cases, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 4, 2011.
116. Id.
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data in a way that aggregates child pornography possession with more
serious crime,117 the more likely another Arizona is to occur.
CONCLUS ION
Many contributions to this Symposium highlight changes in laws that have
benefitted sex offenders. For example, those who have been convicted of
sex offenses have mounted some successful challenges to various registra-
tion and notification laws. But while challenges to sex offender laws have
been successful in some areas, child pornography law challenges have not
fared well. Although a small number of judges have expressed disagreement
with the expansion of child pornography laws,118 those judges are the
exception rather than the rule. For now, the legal battle against child
pornography rages on, despite the fact that current tactics do not appear
well suited to actually protecting children from sexual abuse.
117. See, e.g., Guy Hamilton-Smith, New DOJ Report Demonstrates Stunning Disinge-
nuity on cases Involving Sexual Exploitation of Children, IN JUSTICE TODAY (Jan. 17, 2018),
available at https://injusticetoday.com/new-doj-report-demonstrates-stunning-
disingenuity-on-cases-involving-sexual-exploitation-of-b44a0c444e5d; see also Hessick, Dis-
entangling, supra note 1, at 890–91 n.153–55 (collecting sources).
118. See supra notes 36, 38.
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